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ABSTRACT
The International Fingerprint liveness Detection Competition (LivDet) is an open and well-
acknowledged meeting point of academies and private companies that deal with the problem of
distinguishing images coming from reproductions of fingerprints made of artificial materials and
images relative to real fingerprints. In this edition of LivDet we invited the competitors to propose
integrated algorithms with matching systems. The goal was to investigate at which extent this integra-
tion impact on the whole performance. Twelve algorithms were submitted to the competition, eight
of which worked on integrated systems.
1 Introduction
This paper reports the main relevant results obtained in the sixth edition of the International Fingerprint Liveness
Detection Competition (http://livdet.diee.unica.it).
Born in 2009 with the joint efforts of the University of Cagliari and the Clarkson University, the number of participants
and data publicly provided strongly grew up over the previous editions in 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017 (from this
edition Algorithms and Systems parts were separately leaded by University of Cagliari and the Clarkson University,
respectively). In general, a Fingerprint Presentation Attack Detector (FPAD) or Fingerprint Liveness Detector (FLD) is
a machine learning-based system able to prevent direct attacks to the sensor, by discriminating real and fake fingerprints,
that is, fingerprint derived from artificial replica of alive fingers, also named artefacts.
Although these detectors may be designed as independent and stand-alone with respect to the problem of recognition
or verification of the personal identity, recent works have pointed out the need to investigate their performance when
integrated into real verification systems [2]. Moreover, the need of having a “liveness detection” or “anti-fake” modality
is important for companies interested in placing their products on the market of the computer security.
The previous editions of the LivDet competition were limited to evaluating the performance of a fingerprint liveness
detector operating alone. In real applications, the FPAD system works together with a recognition system in order
to check whether the input comes from a live user or is a fake sample. LivDet 2019 - LivDet in Action∗ invited the
competitors to submit a complete algorithm able not only to output the liveness probability of the image given the
extracted set of features (the so-called “liveness score”) but also an integrated match score which includes the probability
above (“integrated score”), on which basis the final user acceptance/rejection decision is taken. For this reason, this last
edition was devoted to the fingerprint presentation attacks (liveness) detection “in action”.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 makes an overview of fingerprint presentation attack detection with
reference to the 2019 LivDet edition. Participants, datasets and the experimental protocol are shown in Section 3.
Section 4 discusses the competition results. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
∗Title inspired by the paper: “Anti-spoofing in Action : Joint Operation with a Verification System” [2].
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2 Fingerprint Presentation Attack Detection (FPAD)
Software-based FPAD solutions relies on the extraction of anatomical, physiological or texture-based features from
fingerprint images. The first work focused on these systems is from 1998 and it was written by D. Willis and M. Lee
[12]. They discovered that four biometric fingerprint devices out of six were “vulnerable” to spoofing attacks. Later, the
issue was more detailed by Van der Putte [11] and Matsumoto [5], which extended the investigation to other fingerprint
scanners. In the following years, in order to analyse and solve the spoofing problem, various works were published: in
particular a hardware-based solution and the first software-based solution were proposed in the early 2000s [4, 10].
Over the years, liveness detection methods have been refined and recently CNN-based methods have been proposed
[8, 6, 9].
Although the FPAD systems performance has achieved impressive results [7, 3], it is not yet clear the implication of
their non-zero error when integrated into fingerprint verification/recognition applications [2].
For this reason, in this LivDet edition, besides the traditional treatment of the standard {Live, Fake} classification
problem, we investigated at which extent the integration of the liveness detector can impact on the whole performance
of the fingerprint verification system.
3 Participants, data sets and protocols
3.1 Participants
The participants of LivDet are academies and companies. After the registration phase, each competitor must sign a
license agreement detailing the proper usage of data released for the competition. In this edition, it was possible to
participate both with an integrated system and with a standard liveness detection system. Table 1 shows the participants,
the correspondent algorithms names adopted in this paper and the type of system presented.
Participants Algorithm names Type
Anonymous LivDet19_CNN integrated
University of Naples Federico II unina integrated
CENATAV PADUnkFv liveness
Michigan State University Fingerprint Spoof Buster [FSB] liveness
Hangzhou Jinglianwen Technology Co.,Ltd. JLW_LivDet liveness
Hangzhou Jinglianwen Technology Co.,Ltd. JLWa integrated
Hangzhou Jinglianwen Technology Co.,Ltd. JLWs integrated
Sichuan University BRLFptLivDet liveness
Inha University halekim integrated
Chosun University / Suprema ID Inc. JungCNN integrated
Zhejiang University of Technology ZJUT_Det_ATHR integrated
Zhejiang University of Technology ZJUT_Det_S integrated
Table 1: Name of the participants and the submitted algorithms.
3.2 Data Sets
The training set for LivDet 2019 was composed by sub-set of the previous LivDet editions: the Orcanthus Certis2 Image
and Green Bit DactyScan84C images from LivDet 2017 train set and the Digital Persona U.are.U 5160 images from
LivDet 2015 train set. The scanner characteristics are reported in Table 2. It is important to note that the dimensions of
the images acquired with the three sensors are very different from each other: this allows us to evaluate the performance
of the algorithms on the basis of the acquisition surface and of the output images shape. Indeed, as can be seen from the
Figure 1, the images relating to the Digital Persona sensor (column 2) contain only a portion of the fingerprint while in
the other two sensors the fingerprint is present in its entirety.
The LivDet 2019 fake images were collected using the cooperative method. Live images came from multiple acquisitions
of at least six fingers of different subjects. The fakes creation methods can be classified as cooperative or non cooperative
regarding the way the molds are collected. As a matter of fact, in the cooperative methods the mold is created through
user collaboration, while in the non cooperative methods is made using a latent fingerprint.
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Scanner Model Resolution [dpi] Image Size [px] Format Type
Green Bit DactyScan84C 500 500x500 BMP Optical
Orcanthus Certis2 Image 500 300xn PNG Thermal swipe
Digital Persona U.are.U 5160 500 252x324 PNG Optical
Table 2: Device characteristics for LivDet2019 datasets.
Train Test
Dataset Live Wood Glue Ecoflex Body Double Latex Gelatine Live Mix 1 Mix 2 Liquid Ecoflex
Green Bit 1000 400 400 400 - - 1020 408 408 408
Orcanthus 1000 400 400 400 - - 990 384 308 396
Digital Persona 1000 250 250 - 250 250 1019 408 408 408
Table 3: Number of samples for each scanner and each part of the dataset.
Each dataset consists of two parts, the first is the training set, and the second one is the test set. The training set is
released to participants in order to set the classification parameters of their algorithms. We use the test set once the
participants uploaded their algorithms, as executable files.
The fake fingeprints inserted in the test set were created using materials different from those used in the train set. This
consists of 6400 images, whilst the test set contains 6565 images. The number of samples for each scanner is shown in
Table 3. As in the last edition, the fake samples of the training set and those of the test set are built by different members
of the LivDet staff. In this way, we simulated a real scenario, where the ability of the attacker can be different from that
of the laboratory staff. In this edition we created two new spoof material mix, leading to a never-seen-before material in
the presentation attack detection.
3.3 Algorithms Submission
The algorithms submission process for LivDet 2019 is different from that of previous editions. Each submitted algorithm
is a console application with the following list of parameters:
[nameOfAlgorithm] [ndataset] [templateimagesfile] [probeimagesfile][livenessoutputfile] [IMSoutputfile]
The parameter [ndataset] is the identification number of the dataset to analyse, [templateimagesfile] is the text file
name with the list of absolute paths of each template image registered in the system, while [probeimagesfile] is the text
file with the list of absolute paths of each image to analyse. The last two parameters are the path of the output files
where the algorithm saves the result regarding every probe image. In the [livenessoutputfile] the liveness output of
each processed image is saved. This output is the degree of “liveness” normalized in the range 0 and 100 (100 is the
maximum degree of liveness, 0 means that the image is fake). Scores [0, 50) classify fingerprint image as “fake" while
scores [50,100] classify fingerprint image as “live"(in Fig. 2 in blue “livenessoutput"). The [IMSoutputfile] reports for
each probe the combined probability of being a live fingerprint and of belonging to the declared identity, normalized in
the range 0 and 100 (in Fig. 2 in red “IMSoutput"). An IMSoutput between [0, 50) classify fingerprint image as “fake"
or belonging to an attacker while a value between [50,100] classify fingerprint image as “live" and belonging to the
declared user.
The selected classification threshold in order to measure the performance is 50. In both outputs if the algorithm has not
been able to process the image, the corresponding value will be -1000. For the submission of the liveness algorithms,
the last edition protocol was followed [7]. The parameters adopted for the performance evaluation are the following:
• IMG_accuracy: Rate of correctly classified genuine live fingerprints.
• IMI_accuracy: Rate of correctly classified impostor live or genuine fake fingerprints.
• Ferrlive: Rate of misclassified live fingerprints.
• Ferrfake: Rate of misclassified fake fingerprints.
Ferrlive (corresponding to BPCER according to ISO/IEC 30107-1:2016 [1]) and Ferrfake (APCER [1]) are calculated
from the livenessoutput, while IMG_accuracy and IMI_accuracy are calculated from IMSoutput (Integrated Match
Score output).
The IMG score derived from the comparison of a live fingerprint with all the other acquisitions of the same fingerprint
(same person, same finger). We decided to use all the possible combinations, because usually a fingerprint matcher
is not symmetrical. In other words, s(a.b) 6= s(b, a), where a and b are any two fingerprints, and s is any fingerprint
matcher.
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Figure 1: Examples of samples LivDet fingerprints dataset. In the first row live fingerprint for a) Green Bit b) Digital
Persona and d) Orcanthus scanners. In the second row there is Mix 2 spoof material for the e) Green Bit, f) Digital
Persona and g) Orcanthus sensors. In the third row there are Liquid Ecoflex fake samples for the h) Green Bit, i) Digital
Persona and f) Orcanthus devices. In the last row the samples of Mix 1 spoof material, with the same order of the other
rows. We can appreciate in the third column the decay of the scanner. As matter of fact the Orcanthus is a thermal
scanner and the transducer has been progressively ruined due to by the excessive use thus there is a vertical band in the
acquired image.
Figure 2: Block diagram of a possible Integrated Verification System.
The IMI score was calculated considering two types of comparisons: the first is the comparison between a live fingerprint
and the corresponding fake fingerprint (same finger, same person), the second is the comparison between two live
fingerprints of different people. The second class, due to reasons of excessive computational time, has been drastically
reduced. The number of comparisons made is shown in Table 4. Being the number of comparisons for calculating IMI
and IMG different, the total IM accuracy was calculated as the weighted average of the latter. The comparisons number
with the Orcanthus scanner are smaller than with Green Bit and Digital Persona because of the least acquired images
number, see Tab. 3.
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Number of IM scores per class (Genuine/Impostor)
Scanner Green Bit Digital Persona Orcanthus
IMG scores 4080 4072 3960
IMI scores 12852 12836 11776
Total scores 16932 16908 15736
Table 4: Number of integrated match scores (IM) for the accuracy of integrated systems. IMG scores are among live
images of the same user. IMI scores simulate two types of attacks: attacks by an impostor (zero-effort), attacks by a
fake fingerprint (spoofing, by a presentation attack instrument - PAI).
All the comparisons were made with the templates belonging to live fingerprints, while the probes could be both live or
fake in order to simulate a real scenario. It is worth mentioning that, although a fingerprint presentation attack using
templates belonging to a fake sample cannot be excluded, we have not taken into consideration this particular case.
4 Discussions on the reported results
The liveness accuracy of each algorithm on the LivDet test sets, including the overall average accuracy, are summarized
in Table 5. Error rates on live and fake images are also reported. The performance of almost all algorithms on Green
Bit and Orchantus datasets are over 90%. In particular many algorithms reach 99% of accuracy on the Green Bit
dataset. The images acquired with Digital Persona instead have been very difficult to classify and this has reduced the
accuracy of many algorithms. In particular, the unina algorithm confuses more than 80% of fake images with live, but
the performance is below average for the other algorithms too.
It may be seen, in the Orchantus case, that generally the accuracy on the live fingeprints is worse than that on fake
fingers. This strongly impacts when systems are integrated with matchers. By considering the unbalanced performances
in terms of Ferrlive and Ferrfake, it may be hypothesized that the liveness threshold could be relaxed to obtain a better
performance on genuine users, at the expense of misclassifying more fake fingerprints.
Algorithm
Green Bit Digital Persona Orchantus Overall
[%]
Ferrlive
[%]
Ferrfake
[%]
Liveness
Acc.[%]
Ferrlive
[%]
Ferrfake
[%]
Liveness
Acc.[%]
Ferrlive
[%]
Ferrfake
[%]
Liveness
Acc.[%]
LivDet19_CNN 0.88 0.41 99.38 8.54 40.59 73.98 12.22 0.37 93.98 89.11
unina 8.04 6.78 92.65 3.53 81.85 53.77 0.51 5.61 96.82 81.08
PADUnkFv 3.24 1.55 97.68 4.80 7.67 93.63 3.64 2.02 97.21 96.17
FSB 0.49 0.08 99.73 7.37 23.84 83.64 4.95 0.28 97.50 93.62
JLW_LivDet 0.39 1.14 99.20 7.75 13.96 88.86 4.75 0.55 97.45 95.17
JLWa 0.39 1.14 99.20 7.75 14.06 88.81 4.75 0.55 97.45 95.15
JLWs 0.39 1.14 99.20 7.75 14.06 88.81 4.75 0.55 97.45 95.15
BRLFptLivDet 11.08 0.33 94.79 9.62 38.40 74.68 10.91 2.76 93.36 87.61
halekim 4.22 62.17 64.17 8.24 15.70 87.70 28.79 28.03 71.61 74.49
JungCNN 1.08 0.82 99.06 1.67 33.03 81.23 1.11 0.64 99.13 93.14
ZJUT_Det_A 0.39 1.14 99.20 7.75 14.15 88.77 4.65 0.55 97.50 95.16
ZJUT_Det_S 0.39 1.14 99.20 7.75 14.15 88.77 4.65 0.55 97.50 95.16
Table 5: Liveness accuracy of the algorithms on the test sets. For each dataset the rate of misclassified live and fake
fingerprints are reported. The last column is relative to the average of the total accuracy on the three datasets.
The Table 6 shows the results of the integrated systems, in particular the accuracy for each dataset related to correctly
recognized impostors and genuine and the total accuracy calculated as an average between the three datasets. It can be
seen that generally on the Green Bit scanner the IMG_accuracy is higher than IMI_accuracy, and this trend changes
completely in the other two sensors. This can be related to the acquisition area of the sensors used: in particular, the
Green Bit device has an area that covers the entire surface of the finger. A larger area allows to extract more minutiae
and therefore have more points to compare. In particular, the Green Bit sensor area is almost double compared to the
other sensors (Table 2).
Regarding the ZJUT DET algorithm, of which two versions that differed only on the parameters setting have been
presented, it is worth noting that these two versions return very different accuracies. From cross-analysis of liveness
and IMS results 5-6, it is interesting to highlight how the performance of some integrated systems is strongly influenced
by those of liveness, such as halekim, while other algorithms, despite having problems distinguishing false from true,
are able to return a correct output IMS (see DP LivDet19_CNN results). Others, as ZJUT_Det_S, despite having high
liveness results, lose accuracy with the matching module. This can depend on various factors, but the fusion rule of
the matching and liveness results is very important. For those algorithms whose performance in Presentation Attacks
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Algorithm Green Bit Digital Persona Orcanthus OverallIMG_acc IMI_acc Total_acc IMG_acc IMI_acc Total_acc IMG_acc IMI_acc Total_acc
LivDet19_CNN 82.16 99.96 95.67 67.34 98.30 90.84 67.35 100.00 91.78 92.77
unina 88.36 97.81 95.54 71.37 92.78 87.62 76.69 99.58 93.82 92.32
JLWa 99.12 96.60 97.21 89.69 90.31 90.16 92.55 95.97 95.11 94.16
JLWs 99.24 98.72 98.85 88.48 95.75 94.00 91.84 99.80 97.80 96.88
halekim 93.43 82.43 85.08 82.32 96.84 93.35 61.72 96.57 87.80 88.74
JungCNN 98.46 98.26 98.31 96.66 85.98 88.56 96.97 98.33 97.99 94.95
ZJUT_Det_A 99.51 95.89 96.76 93.07 86.65 89.37 92.55 96.01 95.14 93.76
ZJUT_Det_S 99.66 30.24 46.97 92.76 58.43 66.70 96.67 64.50 72.60 62.09
Table 6: IMS accuracy of the algorithms on the test sets [%]. For each dataset the rate of correctly classified genuine
live fingerprints (IMG) and the rate of correctly classified impostor live or genuine fake fingerprints (IMI) are reported.
The last column is relative to the average of the total accuracy on the three datasets.
Detection appears as good, it could be the case to design a better integration algorithm in order to avoid the most
significant problem in fingerprint liveness detection: the user misclassification due to errors introduced by the PAD
analysis suggests that many efforts are still necessary.
5 Conclusion
The sixth edition of LivDet marks a transition point compared to previous editions. As a matter of fact, this edition was
intended to investigate how the integration of a liveness detection system with a fingerprint authentication system might
impact on the performance.
The results show that many of the integrated systems presented achieved a performance of over 90%. We hypothesise
that the low performance were due to a low liveness performance or incorrect setting of the matcher parameters.
To sum up, this six edition is the first one that investigates a complete verification system integrated with a PAD, based
on the state-of-the-art approaches in such topic. We hope to have added some interesting insights for all researchers and
companies working in this challenging matter. From our side, we want to continue on this path, by taking especially
care, in the next edition, on the spoofs quality and materials explicitly synthesised to be “spoofing-effective”.
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